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The power to choose is not only possible in legal framewor-
ks but also outside of them. So far, informal power has 
been viewed as the illegal one in the law, although there 
are many informal, especially personal elements involved 
in the legal decision-making that are never brought to li-
ght. This paper presents a new type of discretion, named 
employee discretion, and shows a promising approach 
towards the idea that officials or judges can decide simi-
larly in similar matters, despite their differences in personal 
backgrounds, cognitive capabilities or emotional variances, 
commonly known as pre-existing preferences. This can be 
done if Bayes’ theorem is used. This way, subjective pre-
ferences could be known to others, while the principles of 
equality and equity could be put on a higher level.
* Professor Mirko Pečarič, Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubljana, Slove-
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1. Introduction
The essence of legal discretion is the power to choose (Cane, 2011), the 
ability to make intelligent decisions (Merriam-Webster, 2019) in a par-
ticular situation. It connotes personal qualities such as prudence, receptiv-
ity, sensibility, intelligence, carefulness, and good judgement. Legislators 
should be aware of the level of delegation of discretion to the other two 
branches of power not only due to the reason of legitimacy but also due to 
the principle of legal certainty. Bound decision-making reflects the ideal 
of a mechanistic decision automaton, without any powers of authentic 
interpretation, in the sense of Montesquieu’s judge as “a mouthpiece that 
reads the letter of the law”, as a passive organ of law-application. Such 
machine-like decision-making is coming to the fore with artificial intelli-
gence or digitalization of governmental processes that challenge human 
intelligence, but this paper nevertheless starts with a predisposition of the 
necessity of discretion also in the future: discretion or the possibility to fill 
open areas with decisions/actions is taken as an unavoidable consequence 
of the fact that “all legal power, as opposed to duty, is inevitably discre-
tionary to a greater or lesser extent” (Wade & Forsyth, 2014, p. 259). Be-
cause power should not be abused, discretion must be exercised reasona-
bly, in good faith and on proper grounds. In a legal state, discretion has to 
be authorized by law and used reasonably, but it stands on shaky grounds 
with the requirement that its usage must be based on clear reasoning, cau-
tious discernment and elaboration of reasons that come uneasily with the 
personal inspirations, abilities, experiences, mode of choice, mindset and 
subliminal influences, personal attitudes and actions connected with that 
(Hardman & Macchi, 2004; Newell, Lagnado & Shanks, 2015; Plessner, 
Betsch & Betsch, 2011; Plous, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These 
elements contradict the discretionary demand for cautious discernment 
or intelligent decision-making. The rational recognition of the content of 
norms and their application to the “legally relevant” facts have a complex 
relationship with people’s irrational and subconscious elements. 
In this paper, a new form of discretion is presented that includes sublim-
inal preferences that remain hidden under the sophistic, logically well-ex-
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priate course of action among legally predetermined possibilities (not only 
in adjudication), while this paper presents employee discretion (ED)1 based 
on the following presumptions: i) legal discretion has a lot of (un)known 
personal elements that operate behind the known ones; and ii) personal 
elements can be put on a more objective and thus equal ground with the 
help of Bayes’ mathematical theorem. This theorem could be a path not 
only towards the clearer grounds of reason, care, and discernment but 
also towards accepting probability as the inevitable element for the man-
agement of uncertainty. These presumptions are based on the elaboration 
of discretion, on its (non)reviewability, on discretion in the public admin-
istration, on pre-existing personal preferences that serve as the key to ED, 
and on Bayes’ theorem (as a method by which subjective preferences can 
be put on a more objective, comparable level), which are presented in the 
following sections. 
2. Discretion
Although Aristotle did not speak explicitly about discretion, he describes 
a wider notion of “practical wisdom” (phrónẽsis) as the personal ability of 
good judgement and excellence of character and experiences to prosper 
in action through giving oneself the appropriate and practical directions 
concerning human goods (Aristotle, 2004). Practical wisdom is listed 
among virtues as an example of a mean2 state (between unscrupulousness 
and unworldliness). Its acquisition requires experience and consists of 
one’s ability to see and understand why and what is important in different 
circumstances. Concerning what is now called effectiveness (to get the 
right things done) and efficiency (the ability to do things right) (Druck-
er, 2002), Aristotle calls virtue that makes “the aim right and practical 
wisdom what makes right the things towards it” (Aristotle, 2004, p. 116). 
Discretion can be seen also as an expression of fairness.3
1 Another type is political discretion (known as the royal prerogative or in France as 
the actes de gouvernement), with which this paper will not deal.
2 In all cases, the mean relative to us is best (Aristotle, 1992, p. 16).
3 In Rhetoric he speaks about fairness as justice that goes beyond the written law, 
where the action is undefinable and the law must speak in general terms. In this regard, it is 
fair “to look not to the law but the legislator and not to the word but the intent of the legis-
lator and not to the action but the deliberate purpose and not to the part but to the whole” 
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For Dicey, the rule of law means the supremacy of regular law as opposed 
to the influence of arbitrary power, or even of wide discretionary authority 
on the part of the government (Dicey, 2012). Hayek similarly thought “the 
discretion left to the executive organs wielding coercive power should be 
reduced as much as possible” (Hayek, 2006, p. 76). Dworkin distinguishes 
two types of (weak) discretion, when “for some reason, the standards an 
official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of 
judgment (or when) … some official has final authority to make a decision 
and cannot be reviewed and reversed by any other official” (Dworkin, 1978, 
pp. 31–32). The strongest type of discretion exists when an official “is simply 
not bound by standards set by the authority in question” (Dworkin, 1978, 
p. 32), but this does not mean “he is free to decide without recourse to 
standards of sense and fairness, but only that his decision is not controlled 
by a standard furnished by the particular authority” (Dworkin, 1978, p. 33). 
This is the kind of discretion with which Dworkin is concerned because he 
– contrary to the positivistic doctrine of (strong) judicial discretion (if a case 
is not controlled by an established rule, it argues a judge must decide it by 
exercising discretion) – thinks judges do not make such arbitrary decisions, 
but rather, settle with something beyond rules: “there must be some princi-
ples that count for more than others” (Dworkin, 1978, p. 37). For Dworkin, 
principles prevail over the absence of rules (discretion).
When using legal discretion, a decision-maker is entitled to decide or act 
according to a system of rules. Among the most important classical rea-
sons for (weak) discretion is “discretion as policy”; it arises due to the 
very inability of legislation to put down everything in advance. Another 
sub-form is “discretion as a choice or as good government”, found in the 
right to good administration4 that goes “further than the law, requiring the 
EU institutions not only to respect their legal obligations but also to be 
service-minded” (Diamandouros, 2012). Good administration can be un-
derstood as more than the law demands; it is not the morality of duty but 
aspiration as “the morality of the good life, of excellence, of the fullest re-
alization of human powers” (Fuller, 1969, p. 5). Such discretion acts upon 
personal preferences and operates outside Dworkin’s doughnut, outside 
legal rules. Here first traces of ED can be found, but there is more to say 
before ED is presented to do justice to the mentioned aspiration. In the 
next section, the known standards of reviewability of discretion are pre-
sented to enable us to go further into its origins. 
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3. (Non)reviewability of Discretion
The US Supreme Court’s decision5 established the legal basis for judicial 
review of administrative agencies’ actions (limited substantive review): 
“the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consider-
ation of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment … Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and 
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not 
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency”. A finding 
is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the 
court, upon examination of the entire evidence, is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.6 Review under 
the clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring a “defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”.7 Discretion-
ary judgement should be based on the full administrative record that a 
decision-maker has at the time of making his decision. Although such 
judgement “does not have to meet the substantial-evidence test (used for 
rulemaking and formal adjudication), the generally applicable standards 
of § 706 require the reviewing court to engage in substantial inquiry. The 
presumption of regularity is not to shield actions from a thorough, prob-
ing, in-depth review” (Breyer et al., 2006, p. 360), although “clear error” 
should be such as to go beyond the confines of reason.
Usually, preclusion of judicial review is a very limited exception used only 
when there is “no law to apply”, when agency action is committed to agen-
cy discretion by law (§ 701(a) APA) or when an agency decision does not 
abuse discretion, i.e. when its decision not to enforce involves a compli-
cated balancing of multiple factors within its expertise, when an agency 
refuses to act and thus not exercise its coercive power, i.e. its prosecutorial 
discretion; the same holds for the cases in which the court has no mean-
ingful criteria against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion8 
or when or how the agency allocates funds from a lump-sum appropria-
tion.9 The same holds for the cases in which the Congress specifically 
5 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
6 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, (1948).
7 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, (2001); Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. 
Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir), (2011).
8 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, (1985).
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identified determinations that should be committed to agency discretion 
by law.10 Discretion is not unbounded when agency action is not unlawful-
ly withheld or unreasonably delayed.11 Discretion must not be fettered (by 
illegal decisions, legal decisions (res judicata), soft law, contracts, under-
takings, representations, and practices by political commitments), trans-
ferred (acting under dictation or delegation by a delegate) or constrained 
(by irrelevant considerations or ignoring the relevant ones, or by improper 
purposes) (Cane, 2011). Claims against an agency’s abuse of discretion 
are concentrated “in one of four ways: by considering an irrelevant factor, 
failing to consider a relevant factor, giving improper weight to a relevant 
factor, or deciding without sufficient evidence” (Saferstein, 1968, p. 368). 
From the restraint review, courts have also moved towards procedural 
(based on the proportionality test, the duty of the competent institution 
to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects/facts of the 
individual case, the right of the person concerned to make their views 
known and to have an adequately reasoned decision), while it remains to 
be seen when a test on evidence-based legislative rationality will be used. 
The unlimited jurisdiction12 is the most intensive ECJ review standard, 
applied for the assessment of whether the Commission’s competition law 
sanction (fine or penalty payment) is proportionate to the seriousness of 
the violation of the competition rules. Strict substantive review on propor-
tionality is used by the ECJ in fundamental rights cases,13 while a process 
review of the national margin of appreciation and discretion is used in 
fulfilling obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
is used.14 Depending on the Rules in question, Art. 47. CFR (the right 
to effective judicial protection) may require a thorough judicial review 
(Samba Diouf), a very restrained review only (Berlioz), or something in 
between (Egenberger), while in a process review of the national margins 
of appreciation and discretion the ECJ assesses whether the legislator’s 
assessment contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power, or 
whether the authority has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion. 
10 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, (1988).
11 Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 324, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir.), (2002).
12 E.g., C-389/10 P - KME Germany and Others v Commission, (2011).
13 E.g., C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland, (2012).
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3.1. Insufficient Judicial Guidelines on Discretion
Discretionary power is not absolute. Limitations are expressed in a variety 
of different ways, such as by saying that “discretion must be exercised rea-
sonably and in good faith, that relevant considerations only must be taken 
into account, that there must be no malversation of any kind, or that the 
decision must not be arbitrary or capricious. They can all be comprised by 
saying that discretion must be exercised in the manner intended by the 
empowering Act” (Wade & Forsyth, 2014, p. 291), but in case-law, there 
is still no guidance on how an irrelevant factor should not be considered, 
how failure to consider a relevant one or giving improper weight to a rel-
evant factor can be prevented. Legislators or judges can test only external 
elements (de internis non judicat preator) of officials’ arguments (whether 
the decision was reasonable, and depending on the importance of the case 
also vis-à-vis the intent, consequences and context) and not the latter’s 
minds. Despite the fact that judges test discretion also in the light of the 
principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, transparency and human rights, 
they place themselves “in the shoes” of public servants, and consider what 
they would do if they were in their place. They subjectively decide what is 
clearly erroneous, how a careful examination or impartial action has been 
done.  They decide based on their intuition, common sense and reason, 
they explain their decision based on arguments that can be logically sound 
but still objectively (based on numerical data) false.
3.2. Soft Law – the Standard of Reviewability v. Discretion
Here the relation between soft law (SL) and discretion is described be-
cause the former can give a deeper view of the latter due to its further de-
tails about rules. From these details, a clearer picture of personal thoughts 
can be revealed. When discretion is not written, SL as its form can offer 
an insight into an officer’s thinking.15 SL is a form of delegation by which 
a superior (tacitly or explicitly) permits a subordinate to do something. SL 
is in its nature of delegation the discretionary option to issue or not some 
form of written or oral instructions. “Whenever one is concerned with 
constraints on administrative decision-makers, one must consider institu-
15 In the Canadian case, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 
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tional as well as individual contexts. Soft law highlights how institutional 
dynamics and individual judgment combine in the exercise of discretion” 
(Sossin & Smith, 2003, p. 874). The origins of SL are – along with the ex-
plicit formal possibility in a statute – based also on discretion: “(w)henever 
an officer has a discretionary power to decide what to do in a particular 
case, he necessarily has the power to announce how he will exercise that 
power. Such an announcement may be an interpretative rule, but it may 
have great value even though, for want of a statutory grant of power, it 
may lack the force of law” (Davis, 1969, p. 220). “Soft law is a particularly 
significant window into the relationship between judicial and bureaucratic 
decision-making. Non-legislative instruments embody the policy choices 
of decision-making bodies, including the interpretation and application 
of new judicial standards. Such discretionary standards and guidelines, 
in turn, are considered as part of the decision-maker’s “expertise”, which 
attracts deference from the Court when discretionary decisions are chal-
lenged” (Sossin, 2004, p. 91). 
SL has, like discretion, similar causes for its existence (due to the new 
technology, complex social and natural problems, a lack of formal legisla-
tive competences, difficulties in a legal procedure or a desire to guarantee 
flexibility and diversity in the shortest time possible), and with (classical) 
discretion it shares a similar standard of review, i.e. a manifest error of 
assessment. Courts usually apply marginal (not full) review that demands 
intervention only in exceptional circumstances. For the General Court an 
error of assessment is not manifest “if, in the particular circumstances of 
the case, it could not have had a decisive effect on the outcome”.16 ECJ 
held that “judicial review is limited to manifest errors of assessment as to 
whether the EU legislature could reasonably have taken the view, first, 
that, to be implemented, the legal framework which is laid down … needs 
only the addition of further detail, without its non-essential elements hav-
ing to be amended or supplemented and, secondly, that the provisions…
require uniform conditions for implementation”.17
Manifest error in the frame of SL could be treated differently than in the 
frame of discretion (despite the fact the first interprets the second); here 
the first presupposes validity of all legal acts (including the discretionary 
ones), so grave errors like an improper purpose, ignoring relevant consid-
erations or taking irrelevant ones into account, unreasonableness as the 
16 T-60/05, Ufex and Others v. Commission (2007), para 77. 
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failure to respect general principles of law, infringement of human rights, 
discrimination, abuse of power or process and hidden motives are illegal, 
and thus do not fall into consideration of whether such SL is valid. The 
manifest error could hence in the relation hard law (HL) – SL be divided 
into manifest error 1 and manifest error 2 (or manifest and less manifest 
error). The validity of SL in the second frame addresses the ambiguous 
and disputable errors of facts or disputable errors of judgement, an ap-
parent disregard of facts of the case (an apparent failure to correctly as-
sess legal and material facts, failure to consider factors that could lead to 
different results or considering irrelevant ones, but they are nevertheless 
not so grave as in the abuse of power or manifest error 1 frame). Manifest 
error 2 occurs when interpretation/argumentation could be different than 
it is. SL with its less manifest error 2 is similar to the above-given conclu-
sion from the previous subsection but can be seen as a further pointer 
towards ED, where the (unknown) errors, fallacies and cognitive illusions 
come more to the fore in decision-making. They are seen as a decision’s 
pre-denominators, usually known as pre-existing preferences. 
4. Public Administration as the Portal into ED
The classical approach to the separation of power is based on trias politi-
ca (the tripartite approach), but public administration (PA) is nowadays 
gaining more and more power. Although the regulatory state “applies and 
extends rule-making, monitoring and enforcement via bureaucratic organs 
of the state” (Levi-Faur, 2011, p. 14) also to other stakeholders, PA is the 
most important factor: the vast majority of legislative proposals (above 
90%) are initiated by the government in e.g. the United Kingdom, Cro-
atia, Finland, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia (Kasemets, 
2001). Along with the complexity of discretion itself, this growth of gov-
ernmental powers vis-à-vis the legislative ones calls for a more detailed 
elaboration of discretion used in the practice of PA. For Hayek, “more 
and more of the tasks which the man in the street imagines to be the main 
occupation of the legislators are performed by civil servants. It is largely 
because the legislatures are preoccupied by what in effect is discretion-
ary administration that the true work of legislation is increasingly left in 
the hands of the bureaucracy” (Hayek, 1998, p. 30). Legislators cannot 
foresee various elements and contexts in different cases, and hence make 
room for PA to fill gaps, weigh interests, balance evidence and decide 
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trative adjudication (as administrative discretion), but there are also other 
forms of it present in administrative actions. 
If the rule of law “means, not that everything is regulated by law, but, on 
the contrary, that the coercive power of the state can be used only in cases 
defined in advance by the law and in such a way that it can be foreseen 
how it will be used” (Hayek, 2006, p. 87), this foreseeability is important 
in PA as the largest public entity regarding the number of issued legal 
acts. Restrained judicial scrutiny gives a lot of open space to the execu-
tive branch of power that can “do what it wants” as long its reasons are 
rationally presented in a logical, readable and understandable way that 
seems as “the most conspicuous and recognizable Orion’s constellation in 
the night sky”. Discretion can be along with good interpretation even bet-
ter understood through the better understanding of officials’ behaviour, 
their everyday (in)actions. They are the ones who apply reason and other 
elements: they use their will (Kelsen, 2005), but also act on subconscious 
elements. 
Art. 298 and 15 of the TFEU emphasise the open, efficient, independ-
ent, transparent and participatory European administration. Undoubted-
ly these demands stand not only formally but are especially relevant in 
practice as the most important aspect in which public employees’ char-
acteristics come to the fore (this holds true also for the national level). 
On all levels, citizens’ rights should not only be formally declared but 
also practically implemented. Formal powers are tightly connected with 
informal considerations; as the latter are applied ex-ante at legal drafting 
and ex-post at the legal implementation, their modus operandi should be 
known. These informal dealings are in PA usually known as discretion. To 
understand this activity of “cautious discernment, prudence or the power 
of free decision-making” (Garner, 2004, p. 499), which happens “when-
ever the effective limits on his [a public officer’s] power leave him free to 
choose among possible courses of action or inaction” (Davis, 1979, p. 4), 
one should understand legal rules are frequently silent on their use, pro-
cedure, intent or consequences vis-à-vis myriad scenarios. In the following 
two sub-sections, two types of subjective discretion are described to gain a 
deeper view of ED.
4.1. Administrative (Informal) Discretion
Administrative discretion can be present in all of the so far mentioned 
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control has settled around the known approaches or standards of con-
trol, but there are things courts so far have not embraced in strict legal 
frames (legal positivism). Davies in 1969 further invented the notion of 
discretionary justice in a place where law ends. For him, discretion is not 
limited to what is legal but includes all that is within the effective limits 
of the officer’s power. His informal discretionary power is the lifeblood 
of administrative processes and includes functions such as “initiating, 
prosecuting, negotiating, settling, contracting, dealing, advising, threat-
ening, publicizing, concealing, planning, recommending and supervising” 
(Davis, 1977, p. 440), while the most awesome discretionary power is 
the “omnipresent power to do nothing” (Davis & Pierce, 1994, p. 105). 
The widely known examples are police’s and state prosecution’s possibility 
(not) to initiate procedures, known also as prosecutorial discretion (Shap-
iro, 1982). Such examples exist, but there is more: based on a thorough 
examination of reasons pro et contra weak and strong discretion, Vila con-
cludes that “(i)t is not disagreement but the limit to our ability to imagine 
how things are and to present them in their best light what leads to the 
need for strong discretion. Surely, limits remain, but to consider that they 
rule wherever disagreement and controversy rule would suggest disheart-
ening scepticism about the potential of human imagination” (Vila, 2001, 
p. 205). Davis’ informal discretionary power is the closest to this paper’s 
notion of ED; the latter could be seen as an extended, updated version of 
informal discretion with its emphasis (not on the law, but) on employees 
as persons, who apply their mental, cognitive functions, mixed with their 
character to abstract or specific contexts. While the administrative and 
political discretion is known, ED is not. Because it is practised daily and 
on an even larger scale and scope than the previous two, it needs to be 
brought to light.
4.2. Employee Discretion
ED is the deeper form of discretion because it does not provide an an-
swer that could be (equally) correct, it does not even respect the system’s 
boundaries and does not provide clear or open criteria to choose among 
different solutions. It can be imagined simply as all possible human do-
ings at work, as a reflection of various human characters. For ED, there is 
no obligation to lay down reasons that justify officials’ choices; room for 
choice is not understood as a power, permission or authorisation granted 
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al endorsement to act or decide when the law does not provide a univocal 
solution, when the law is silent, when the law does not even widely incor-
porate/presuppose actions.
ED arises not only from the binary (non-)usage of official competencies, 
the (in)activation of official powers (that are (un)determined for a specific 
official position), the interpretation of (un)determined legal notions vis-
Þ-vis formal goals, legal principles or personal wishes but exhibits itself in 
all their combinations. ED is about (in)actions within the existing com-
petencies in the light of future solutions and improvements, which are 
ex-post acknowledged by the management as essential for the agency’s 
operations. ED could be a denominator of the public employee’s will to 
do or not to do something, to give lesser or greater weight to something, it 
can be present even in cases where an employee does not exercise admin-
istrative discretion (but nevertheless does everything to undermine a legal 
rule, its goal or consequences, without clearly shown abuse of power). 
It is present also where well-established techniques, procedures or legal 
standards are enacted (what an employee will do on a particular day, who 
he will listen to, for how long, what kind of energy will be put in some 
doing, what usual or unusual means he will use for a specific assignment, 
to which problem he will give more attention and what weight he will give 
to arguments, evidence, or what facts he will recognise as (non-)alarming 
or (not) important. ED depends on many factors that cannot even be 
enumerated, let alone fully explained or predicted).
Based on such a description, ED fits into legal realism; Holmes (2009) 
as the founder of this movement has warned of other elements, besides 
logical thinking, while Frank, who was also familiar with psychology and 
psychoanalysis, denied the existence of legal rules in advance of an indi-
vidual judicial decision based on the necessary existence of this personal 
element, based on which a person acts accordingly (Frank, 1949, p. 138). 
According to Frank’s perception, the quest for absolute legal certainty 
(as an example of a child-like yearning for fatherly authority) goes to-
wards the impossible legal inflexibility and infallibility. ED can be the 
other name for the personality that embraces the character, psychological 
elements, experiences, milieu, logic, skills, intelligence and silliness at the 
same time, and in all their combinations. For the Nobel laureate Kahne-
man, the neglect of base rates and insensitivity to the quality of informa-
tion are common biases of prediction (Kahneman, 2013). The latter part 
is addressed in the next section, and the former (as the most important 
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5. Cognitive Elements of ED
Bad implementation put aside, the first condition of good decision-ma-
king is the awareness of cognitive flaws. This is the biggest shortcoming of 
ED. Human intuition and common sense based on (everyday) experience 
can fail when something new/different is present. Hume’s idea that reason 
is the slave of our passions (Hume, 2009) got many updates in the primacy 
of intuition (Baron, 1998; Haidt, 2012; Kahneman, 2013), of actions be-
fore reason, reflections and discourse (Kaplan, 2012) based on impulse 
and desire (Russell, 2015), where demands for common sense are often 
only calls for a greater use of intuition (Hammond, 1996; Watts, 2011). 
Heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), overconfidence (Dunning et al., 
1990), ex-post rationalisations (Varoufakis, 2002) and other biases mu-
ddle reason with emotion; in fact, “there is no inner contrast between 
emotion and reason: emotion is the main source of motivation steering us 
towards certain goals; it can steer a considerable power of reason towards 
the goals that it gives rise to” (Simon, 1997, p. 91). Even more, emotions 
form in the amygdala (a small, two-sided structure in the temporal lobe 
of the brain) that causes emotional learning and evaluation, particularly 
in provoking emotional responses to fear or aggressive stimuli (Adolphs, 
Tranel & Damasio, 1998). As people do not make decisions based solely 
on reason, they should be aware of caveats like the confirmation bias, ex-
post rationalisation, and other systematic errors in thinking. Traditional 
(and legal) understanding of rational decision-making is at odds with the 
psychological idea of the primacy of actions and their ex-post rationalisa-
tions. 
There is a lot of other literature on personal cognitive elements, while the 
existence of (cognitive) preferences in decision-making can be seen in the 
following cases: imagine that an officer has to decide on the probability 
that an inspection will find a violation in a new, suspected case:
Case 1: In 100 inspections, 45 legal violations were found that stood the le-
gal test with remedies in 70% of cases. Where no remedies were used, these 
cases still present 5% of infringements. What is the probability that a new 
taxpayer violates rules in the inspected area?
Case 2: 5 violations occurred in 365 cases. In the case of violations, inspec-
tions had previously correctly assumed the presence of violations in 90% of 
cases, and in 10% of cases, violations were present where inspections did not 
suspect them. What is the probability that a new case represents a violation 
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Case 3: A worker has been present in working shifts in 142 cases out of 
1029, and in 8 cases (out of 19) he was present when violations occurred. 
Could he be a suspect? 
Intuitively, case 1 has lower and case 2 higher probability, while in case 3 
the worker is probably a suspect. But is this true? Intuitively yes, rationally 
no (with the help of Bayes’ rule, see the next chapter, probabilities in the 
cases 1, 2 and 3 are 91.97%, 11.1% and 10.42%, respectively). ED could 
in such cases – due to the erroneously determined base rate – consume 
energy for totally wrong cases. Subjective reasons are present in deci-
sion-making. In the above-given lines, ED is described in such a way that 
the official’s discretionary power may be due to the complexity of its use 
so limited vis-à-vis formal controls, that the elements of obligation to state 
(true) reasons or accountability do not even come into the fore. One way 
to predict the outcome of any future decision is a set of prior decisions in 
which decision-makers had responded to facts presented to them, along-
side with the individual drives, ideological preferences and dislikes in the 
mind of the concerned. The principle of quadruple reality establishes all 
parts of reality as a probability. Here comes in handy Bayes’ theorem that 
also consists of four parts, with an additional possibility to calculate prob-
ability, being for Cicero (1853) the very guide of life. 
6. Pre-Existing Preferences as the Key to ED
ED is a living, flexible thing. It is a mix of emotions, reason and courage 
that can all present themselves in decisions/actions in four ways: true posi-
tive, false positive, true negative and false negative. ED is a mix of human 
(in)actions, values, (ir)rational thinking, human empathy, emotions, the 
(sub)conscious and other elements that function as priors or base rates that 
act subliminally to decision-making. These preconceptions as personal fac-
tors are also the basic ingredients of judicial decision-making.18 Different 
personal pre-existing preferences can lead to different decisions/actions/conclu-
sions in the same case. Officials should not – from the point of equality and 
18 Judges estimate the likelihood (e.g. that a witness tells the truth) “based on previ-
ous experience in similar cases ... This pre-inquiry estimate is what is called a “prior prob-
ability” or just a “prior”. The judge’s mind will be unconscious of his having such a prior, and 
he would be most unlikely to express it in quantitative terms. But it would be there, and it 
would affect his posterior probability–that is, the probability that he would assign to the wit-
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non-discrimination – proceed according to their own will, private affection 
or even in bad faith (Weber’s sine ira et studio), but on the other hand, it is 
undeniable that in discretionary judgement are present also personal cog-
nitive and logical capacities, emotions, desires, interests and unconscious 
prejudices or preconceptions present as the forms of tacit thinking (Po-
lanyi, 2009) juxtaposed to clear analytic and synthetic reasoning.
The letter is influenced not only by childhood background, education, 
residence and prevalent social beliefs but also by personal character. ED 
goes prima facie contrary to the established understanding of prohibition 
of bias or personal affections in legal decision-making. Because the law 
should not be biased, case-law understandably does not mention personal 
pre-existing preferences, but they are from a psychological point of view 
the key into the depths of ED; “good faith” review presupposes the agency 
has acted in such faith, without bias, prejudice, or unfairness. If courts 
prima facie do not find these three elements, they do not actively search 
for them and do not demand that such evidence be provided and hence 
uphold a discretionary decision. Prior beliefs (base rates or preferences) 
can be reconciled with the (new) evidence with the help of Bayes’ rule 
that ranks hypotheses based on subjective probability. Personal precon-
ceptions can be thus more “objective” (or easily compared) parts in ra-
tional thought. 
7. Bayes’ Theorem
As people always think up to a point also subjectively, based on their 
personal perspectives, feelings and thoughts, probability can be better es-
tablished in the subjective Bayesian framework, in which how much we 
believe something after we have seen the evidence depends not only on 
what the evidence shows but on our pre-existing preferences (pre-investi-
gation, prior probability or just a prior) or weights that affect our view on 
evidence or how much we believed in the evidence from the start. After 
an analysis of nine theories of judicial behaviour (attitudinal, strategic, 
sociological, economic, organizational, pragmatic, phenomenological and 
legalist), Posner concluded that Bayesian decision theory can be helpful 
to understand judicial preconceptions in shaping responses to uncertain-
ty. Understanding does not presuppose also that Bayesian decision theory 
can be used by other higher instances, as the latter do not possess subjec-
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Bayes’ theorem (BT) is a tool by which a decision-maker – if they want to 
be more objective – can more effectively use their prior knowledge of con-
ditions that might be related to the event and known facts about the latter 
to calculate the probability of an event and/or criteria for a more impartial 
assessment of the validity and reliability of the evidence itself vis-à-vis all 
types of scrutiny: manifest error, procedural proportionality (suitability, 
necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu), limited substantive, or finally 
substantial review.19 The latter was being proclaimed in the case where the 
US Supreme Court stated that a trial court has not only the power but 
the obligation to act as a gatekeeper in determining whether an expert’s 
opinion is based on scientific reasoning and methodology. The Court gave 
a non-exclusive list of four factors that help ascertain whether a theory’s 
or technique’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid 
and can be properly applied to the facts at issue: “Including whether the 
theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it 
has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential 
error rate, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its 
operation and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a 
relevant scientific community”.20
BT can give us a clearer base rate and outcome of a person’s thinking with-
in the frame of ED when a decision-maker explains the numbers (percent-
ages) used in BT on which he established the probability of an event. If 
we want to establish that event A arises if B occurs (A|B), these mutually 
exclusive events are multiplied and their result divided by B (because A|B 
cannot occur if B does not occur), so we get Bayes’ rule: P(A|B)= P(A) 
x P(B|A)/ P(B).21 If we want to establish the occurrence of event A, we 
need not only establish that B has occurred, but also than B has not (~) 
occurred: P(A)= P(B) x P(A|B) + P(~B) x P(A|~B). As P(A|B)/P(B) is 
equal to P(B|A)/P(A), we get Bayes’ theorem as total probability: P(A|B)= 
P(B|A) x P(A)/P(B|A) x P(A)+P(B|~A) x P(~A).22 The same, more simply 
19 See three examples in the fifth section.
20 C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council (2014); Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993), para 12-15.
21 Each bit of information the judge receives on that truthfulness would be likely to 
alter his prior probability, but not erase it; the prior probability would affect the posterior 
probability as in Ω [odds] (H|x) = p(x|H)/p(x|~H) x Ω(H), the simplest version of Bayes’ 
theorem (Posner, 2010, p. 66).
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presented Bayes’ theorem is in the form of a decision tree (P= a x b/a x b 
+ c x d):
Figure 1. Bayes’ Theorem as a Decision Tree
Source: Author.
An individual’s classificatory apparatus “not only differs among individ-
uals but can be altered by experience, which varies from individual to 
individual … people see (literally and figuratively) things differently, and 
how they see things, changes in response to changes in the environment” 
(Posner, 2010, p. 68). People/experts of the same background can form 
different opinions from the same data (the same holds when reading the 
same book or watching the same movie), and though this is acceptable in 
some areas it is unwelcome in the law when rights and obligations should 
be equally determined in similar cases. By assessing priors, decision-mak-
ers can become more comfortable with probability and uncertainty, and 
at the same time, the “echo chambers” of unfounded claims (or even er-
roneously established case-law) can be avoided.23 ED by using BT resem-
bles Sunstein’s well-functioning system of free expression that must meet 
two requirements: “people should be exposed to materials they would not 
have chosen in advance (heterogeneity), and many or most citizens should 
have a wide range of shared experiences (homogeneity)” (Sunstein, 2017, 
pp. 6–7). BT can lift a person’s unconscious intelligence, gut feeling or 
intuition to a more reflective, deliberate, and analytic level.
23  Consider a situation where an authority has to decide if a foreign migrant should 
be put into quarantine because he shows symptoms of the Covid-19 disease: among 1000 
people, 10 have a virus. Of those 10, eight showed a symptom, and of the 990 not afflicted, 
95 did too. What is the probability that this migrant has the virus? By using BT, there is only 
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Emotions, beliefs and/or weights (priors) decision-makers have, affect 
how (much) probability (usually known as evidentiary standards) they as-
sign to actions or consequences. The value of such an approach is in the 
emphasis on priors that affect the “impartial or apolitical” opinion of a 
decision-maker. Officials in PA could hence calibrate themselves occa-
sionally to (re)establish at least roughly similar priors to approach similar 
cases similarly. A personal subjective probability (the priors) can be with 
BT more objectively determined by an employee himself (as a self-check 
that can also be easily calculated)24 or it can be further advanced when 
priors are put down on paper and thus become more easily tested also by 
other people or an agency.25 Employees could obtain data from various 
(statistical) databases maintained by national authorities from particular 
fields (or from other stakeholders), but it should also be borne in mind, 
however, that numerical data are not always available for all cases.   
BT can nevertheless be seen as an approach that tries to reveal invisible 
base rates that are nowadays still “hidden” in standards of evidence (e.g., 
substantial evidence, preponderance of the evidence) and elaborated only 
with words. When base rates are put down in numbers, a “correct” base-
line for the purposes of corrective self-awareness can be additionally test-
24 There are many websites available where the Bayes’ calculator can be used (e.g., 
https://www.richardcarrier.info/bayescalculator.html). 
25 In 2004, the court of appeals convicted Lucia de Berk, a nurse from the Juliana 
Children’s Hospital in the Hague, to life imprisonment for 7 murders and 3 attempted 
murders. A statistician calculated that the probability that something like this would happen 
by pure coincidence, is less than 1 in 342 million; he put an explicit warning that this does 
not imply that Lucia is a murderer. If Bayes’ rule is used on the relevant numbers of this 
case (the number of shifts, and incidents for Lucia and others in total for three hospitals, 
presented in Grünwald (2007), it can be calculated that Lucia had a 53% probability that an 
incident would happen in her shift, and others had therefore 47%. Regarding her shifts and 
incidents, there was an 11.59% probability, while for all others it was 88.41%. This roughly 
corresponds to a 1: 9 ratio; based on the math and Gamma distribution Gill (2006) came 
to a similar conclusion: “(a) modest amount of variation makes the chance that an innocent 
nurse experiences at least as many incidents as the number Lucia actually did experience, 
the somewhat unremarkable one in nine” (2006). This would mean that a nurse’s probability 
of being guilty is far away from the beyond reasonable doubt standard. Gigerenzer (2002) 
describes also a German case of a chimney sweep who was accused of having committed a 
murder in Wuppertal, Germany. Dr Christian Rittner, a lecturer at the University of Bonn, 
evaluated the traces of blood as follows: 17.29% of German citizens share the suspect’s blood 
group, traces of which have been found underneath the fingernails of the murdered woman; 
15.69% of Germans share her blood group that was also found on the suspect’s boots; based 
on a so-called “cross-combination”, the expert subsequently calculated an overall probability 
of 97.3% that the suspect “can be considered the murderer”. Gigerenzer has a contrario cal-
culated that the probability is 1: 2710 (Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 74). Based on Bayes’ rule, the 
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ed along with the present arguments in words. Despite the availability of 
BT, decision-makers or employees should always bear in mind that the 
mere statistical probability cannot per se be used as the only evidence in a 
proceeding without also having other hard evidence available that would 
give to this probability a “real relation” to probability. Notwithstanding the 
known method of the mathematical BT (Carrier, 2012; Finkelstein & Fair-
ley, 1970; Hacking, 2001) in the law, it is rarely used. BT is useful to assess 
other evidence against statistical and scientific evidence (Kadane, 2008) or 
to analyse DNA and other evidence (Ayres & Nalebuff, 2015; Finkelstein 
& Fairley, 1970; 1971), but it can serve also for a better elaboration of ED. 
Results should not be taken for granted, but they could be useful at least 
for a better (more objective) interpretation of psychological preferences 
and objective facts. Bayesian approach is used e.g. in medicine and health 
management (Barbini, Manzi & Barbini, 2013), but doctors still retain the 
final say. BT should be thus seen as a helpful tool for the better administra-
tion of ED, while the final say would still be on the officials.
8. Conclusion
The mere shortcomings of static rules and human characteristics cause 
the emergence of discretion regardless of its (un)acceptability, with the 
hope that officials will recognise what is relevant or irrelevant (like a cha-
meleon changes its colour in different environments). Due to the different 
preferences or base rates persons have, there cannot be one right answer 
or decision, and neither are objective morality and/or decisions based 
solely on rules and principles. Subjective (subconscious) preferences also 
affect conscious decisions. ED is an attempt to bring to light situations 
that are present in the background of decision-making. “ED is the most 
“living thing” (a mix of emotions, reason and courage) in the rules, due to 
its presentation of human (in)actions, values, (ir)rational thinking, human 
empathy or emotions, the (sub)conscious and other elements” (Pečarič, 
2018, p. 6). ED can be evaluated vis-à-vis the public interest/goals: how 
much has an official contributed to public goals with his or her actions?
As a complex process that always involves extra-legal elements, ED can be 
a new step on the line of positivism, but it is divorced from the latter with 
its irrational and unreasonable elements. ED can be found in soft law, in 
the executive’s material acts, negotiation, communication and constant 
interactions with co-workers, citizens and interest groups. ED is a mix of 
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as a lense through which facts are established); the gist is to find how 
these lenses as pre-existing preferences come to the fore, i.e. how they are 
engraved in decisions, and how they can be controlled. ED diminishes 
legal delusions on discretion, shows the weaknesses of present-day legal 
controls on discretionary judgement, but also proposes a way through 
which personal elements can be put on similar ground. As for the control 
on ED, the same holds true for this approach – its further development 
will be based on officials’ personal (in)actions.
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BAYES’ THEOREM AS A TOOL FOR BETTER ADMINISTRATION 
OF EMPLOYEE DISCRETION
Summary 
This paper presents a new form of discretion that deals with subliminal (person-
al) preferences, which are present in discretionary decision-making (where the 
mental, cognitive functions of public servants, mixed with their character and 
“dressed” with sophistic, logically well-explained and legally allowed reasons are 
present). This paper presents employee discretion that could be a denominator of 
the public employees’ will to do or not to do something, to give lesser or greater 
weight to something. The power to choose is hence not only possible in legal 
frameworks but also outside of them. So far, informal power has been viewed in 
the law as the illegal one, although there are many informal, especially personal 
elements involved in the legal decision-making that are never brought to light. 
This paper offers a promising approach to how decisions can be similar in similar 
matters, despite their differences in personal backgrounds, cognitive capabilities 
or emotional variances. This can be done if Bayes’ theorem is used. Probability 
can here be established based on how much we believe something after we have 
seen the evidence; this depends not only on what the evidence shows but also on 
our pre-existing preferences (pre-investigation, prior probability or just a pri-
or) or weights that affect our view on evidence or how much we believed in the 
evidence from the start. By assessing priors, decision-makers can become more 
comfortable with probability and uncertainty, and at the same time, the “echo 
chambers” of unfounded claims can be avoided. This way, subjective preferences 
could be known to others, while the principles of equality and equity could be 
raised to a higher level. Further development of employee discretion is based on 
the same grounds as this type of discretion – on our personal (in)actions.
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BAYESOV TEOREM KAO ALAT ZA BOLJE UPRAVLJANJE 
PROSTOROM SLOBODNOG ODLUČIVANJA JAVNIH 
SLUŽBENIKA
Sažetak
U radu se analizira novi oblik slobodnog odlučivanja koji se temelji na podsvje-
snim (osobnim) preferencijama koje se pojavljuju u slobodnom odlučivanju (u 
kojem su intelektualne, odnosno kognitivne funkcije javnih službenika pomije-
šane s njihovom osobnošću presvučene sofisticiranim, logički lako objašnjivim i 
pravno dopuštenim razlozima). Prostor slobodnog odlučivanja može biti naziv-
nik volje javnog službenika da nešto učini ili ne učini ili da nečemu dade manju 
ili veću težinu. Moć odabira je moguća u pravnim okvirima ali i izvan njih. 
Dosad se u pravu neformalna moć smatrala nezakonitom, premda su mnogi 
neformalni, osobito osobni elementi o kojima se nikad ne govori uključeni u do-
nošenje odluka u pravu. Radom se nastoji razviti takav pristup koji bi osigurao 
da u sličnim stvarima odluke budu slične usprkos razlikama u osobnim poza-
dinama, kognitivnom kapacitetu ili emocionalnim varijacijama, i to na temelju 
Bayesovoga teorema. Moguće je utvrditi vjerojatnost da će čovjek nešto vjerovati 
nakon što vidi dokaze; to ovisi o tome što pokazuju dokazi i kakve su njegove 
prethodne sklonosti (prethodna saznanja, prethodna vjerojatnost ili prethodna 
uvjerenja) ili ponderi koji utječu na njegov pogled na dokaze ili vjeru koju im 
pridaje na početku. Spoznajući svoja preduvjerenja donositelji mogu mirnije 
donositi odluke u uvjetima vjerojatnosti i neizvjesnosti, a u isto vrijeme mogu se 
izbjeći odjeci neutemeljenih prigovora. Na taj se način mogu osobne preferencije 
donositelja odluke učiniti poznate drugima, a načela jednakosti i pravednosti 
mogu se podići na višu razinu. Daljnji razvoj prostora slobodnog odlučivanja 
javnih službenika temelji se na istom temelju kao i taj tip slobodnog odlučivanja 
– na čovjekovim osobnim (ne)djelovanjima. 
Ključne riječi: slobodno odlučivanje, upravna diskrecija, prostor slobodnog od-
lučivanja javnih službenika, Bayesov teorem
